The Citizens' Assembly on Brexit was a major exercise in deliberative public engagement conducted in autumn 2017. It brought together fifty randomly selected members of the public for two carefully structured weekends of listening, learning, reflecting and discussing. Assembly Members considered what post-Brexit arrangements the UK should pursue, focusing on trade and migration. On trade, most Members wanted the UK to pursue a bespoke arrangement with the EU and rejected the option of leaving the EU with no deal. On migration, most wanted the UK to maintain free movement of labour while using already available policy levers to reduce immigration numbers. These findings provide unique insight into informed public opinion on vital, pressing policy questions. The Assembly also illustrates the valuable role that such deliberative exercises could play in UK democracy. We suggest they could be particular helpful for unlocking progress on issues, such as the future of social care, that are often felt to be 'too difficult' to handle.
Introduction
What kind of Brexit do the public think the UK should pursue? The Brexit vote told us that a majority of voters wanted to leave the EU, but it said little about their preferences for the form that Brexit should take. Public opinion surveys offer some insights, but often encourage respondents to provide simple answers to complex questions; they shed little light on public attitudes relating to necessary trade-offs, and do not give respondents a chance to absorb or discuss key information on the issue in question.
A major exercise in deliberative public engagement conducted in autumn 2017 -the Citizens' Assembly on Brexit -offers much deeper evidence. It provides unique insights into what kind of Brexit voters want once they have had a chance to learn about the options and arguments, think them through carefully, and discuss them with a wide range of their peers. This article sets out the Assembly's findings and the lessons that can be drawn from them.
First, we outline what the Citizens' Assembly on Brexit was: a body of fifty people reflecting the diversity of the UK electorate, who gathered over two carefully structured weekends to reach conclusions on what post-Brexit arrangements the UK should pursue. Second, we set out the Assembly's conclusions. The Assembly focused on two major policy areas: trade and migration. Most Members wanted the UK to pursue a bespoke trading arrangement with the EU. They strongly rejected the option of leaving the EU with no trade deal. On migration, most wanted the UK to maintain free movement of labour while using already available policy levers to reduce immigration numbers.
The third section assesses what weight we should place on these findings by examining the degree to which the Assembly can reasonably be said to provide insights into informed, considered public opinion. We suggest that it scores very highly. Finally, we consider the broader lessons that the Assembly provides for the part that deliberative exercises such as this might play in UK democracy in the future. We argue that such bodies could have a major role in strengthening democratic policymaking.
The Citizens' Assembly on Brexit
The Citizens' Assembly on Brexit brought together a cross-section of the UK electorate to deliberate on key Brexit choices and deliver recommendations. It was modelled on previous citizens' assemblies in Canada, the Netherlands, and Ireland, which led to referendums on electoral reform in two Canadian provinces and on same-sex marriage and abortion in Ireland.
1 Citizens' assemblies seek to embody a deliberative conception of democracy, according to which decision-making follows an inclusive process of discussion where all perspectives are heard and considered carefully in light of evidence.
The Assembly was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and organised by a team led from the Constitution Unit at University College London and comprising the authors of this article.
The fifty members of the Citizens' Assembly on Brexit were chosen through random selection to reflect the diversity of the UK electorate. A UK-wide survey with 5,000 respondents was conducted by ICM in July 2017, including questions on whether respondents would be interested in participating in the Assembly. Those who answered positively were stratified according to six criteria: age, gender, ethnicity, social class, place of residence, and how they voted in the 2016 EU referendum. They were then selected randomly within these groups and contacted individually until the required number and balance of people had been recruited. Table 1 shows that the Assembly membership closely resembled the wider population on all criteria but one: non-voters in the referendum were under-represented. Crucially, the Assembly reflected the referendum outcome in that slightly more Members voted Leave than Remain. The overarching question considered by the Assembly was: What kind of Brexit should the UK seek? Within this, it focused on two key policy areas: trade and migration. The Assembly thus did not reopen the question asked in the 2016 referendum: the intention was to feed into current government policy-making. Nor did it examine all aspects of Brexit: a narrow focus was essential to allow considered discussion within the time available.
The Assembly met over two weekends in Manchester. These weekends were designed with five core principles in mind: maximising the inclusiveness of the discussions for all Members; promoting understanding of the issues at stake; ensuring balance among competing perspectives on the kind of Brexit the UK should seek; promoting effective deliberation among Assembly Members; and allowing Members space to engage in personal reflection.
In pursuit of these principles, plans for the weekends were developed in close collaboration with Involve, a charity specialising in deliberative public engagement. The first weekend was the 'learning' phase, during which Members reflected on their own ideas, listened to other Members, and engaged closely with leading experts on trade, migration, and the EU. These experts reflected a range of perspectives. They were selected in consultation with a diverse Advisory Board, who comprised both supporters and opponents of Brexit, as well as neutral experts experienced in presenting balanced information. The Advisory Board also provided detailed guidance during the development of a series of briefing papers, which Members could read between the weekends. The second weekend was largely devoted to the 'discussion and decision' phase. This was an opportunity for Members to deliberate in depth among themselves before deciding their own views. They also reflected on their thinking and were reminded of the options available and what the experts had said about them. They then voted on these options by secret ballot. Members then built on this initial discussion to develop policy guidelines in relation to both trade and migration. As is apparent from Table 3 , Members' ambitions for trade policy were wide-ranging and included some items -notably the desire to avoid a hard border with Ireland -that at the time had received little public attention. On migration, meanwhile, Members were clearly concerned that policy-makers should not focus just on the rules about who can or cannot stay in the UK. They also wanted the government to attend to domestic policies that might affect migration patterns -such as training for UK nationals -and to outcomes that are affected by migration -such as the quality of public services. Having developed these policy guidelines, Members then considered and voted on concrete options for post-Brexit trade and migration policy. We split trade policy into two areas: trade with the EU; and trade with countries beyond the EU. That meant there were three policy areas in total.
Before each vote, Members heard an introductory presentation that outlined the options available, recapping key themes from the first weekend's expert presentations and the briefing papers. They then debated the options and their preferences in small groups (with scope to ask questions to experts in the room if they wanted). Finally, they voted by secret ballot, ranking the options in order of preference.
At present, trade with the EU is governed primarily by the UK's membership of the Single Market. The Assembly considered four possible approaches for the future:
 Option A: Stay in the Single Market, at least as it relates to goods and services.  Option B: Leave the Single Market, and seek a comprehensive trade deal that would maintain zero tariffs and minimise non-tariff barriers through harmonisation or mutual recognition.  Option C: Leave the Single Market and seek a limited trade deal that would maintain zero tariffs but not address non-tariff barriers.  Option D: Do no trade deal with the EU.
As Figure 1 shows, Members' first preferences spread widely across the first three options; few chose the fourth, 'no deal' option. The plurality option was a limited trade deal (option C); but most Members (twenty-eight out of fifty) preferred some kind of closer relationship with the EU (option A or B).
Figure 1. Trade with the EU: first preferences
Figure 2 takes account not just of first preferences, but also of Members' second, third and fourth preferences. It assigns three points to a first preference, two to a second preference, one to a third preference, and none to a fourth preference. Using this approach, the option of a comprehensive trade deal came marginally ahead, as it received many second preferences. This option also comes first if the preferences are counted using the Alternative Vote method. 
Figure 2. Trade with the EU: points for preferences
We asked Assembly Members to rank the options primarily because it may be that the UK cannot get everything it wants. While the UK government is seeking a comprehensive trade deal that gives the easiest possible access for UK goods and services to the Single Market, the remaining EU countries have warned they will not allow the UK to 'cherry-pick'. The voting also allows us to see Assembly Members' preferences if a bespoke deal turns out to be unavailable. The Assembly considered three options for governing post-Brexit trade with countries outside the EU:
• Option A: Stay in the Customs Union, so that the UK applies EU external tariffs and joins (but does not, as a result of Brexit, take part in negotiating) EU trade deals. • Option B: Do a bespoke customs deal with the EU allowing the UK to conduct its own international trade policy while maintaining a frictionless UK/EU border. • Option C: Do no customs deal, so that the UK can conduct its own trade policy, but physical customs controls on the UK/EU border are needed.
As shown in Figure 5 , Members, by a substantial majority, saw a bespoke deal as the best option.
Figure 5. Trade beyond the EU: first preferences
Whether a bespoke deal of this kind is feasible, however, remains in doubt. Should it prove impossible, a large majority of Assembly Members, as Figure 6 shows, said that the UK should stay in the Customs Union rather than leave the EU with no customs deal. They thus prioritised maintaining a frictionless UK/EU border over freeing the UK to conduct its own international trade policy. The Assembly's decisive rejection of the 'no deal' options for trade with both EU and non-EU countries is striking. It is not a comment on whether keeping these options on the table is a good negotiating strategy: that is not what the Assembly considered. But it does raise doubts about the credibility of this strategy: if, in late 2018 or 2019, public opinion is similarly hostile to leaving the EU with no deal, it will be hard for any government to push such a Brexit through.
Moving from trade to migration, migration between the UK and the EU is currently governed by the EU principle of free movement, which applies to people in employment or self-employment, as well as to students and anyone who can sustain themselves financially. The Assembly considered five options for post-Brexit policy:
• Option A: Maintain free movement of labour and continue to operate it as today. • Option B: Maintain free movement of labour, but make full use of available controls to prevent abuse of the system. • Option C: End free movement and reduce immigration overall, but continue giving EU citizens favourable access compared with people from outside the EU. • Option D: Remove any preference for EU over non-EU citizens, while maintaining current immigration levels.
• Option E: Remove any preference for EU over non-EU citizens, and reduce immigration overall.
These options vary on two dimensions: the degree of preference given to EU over non-EU immigration; and the overall level of immigration into the UK. These two dimensions do not always coincide. Some people who want to end free movement between the UK and the EU do not want to cut immigration: rather, they want the UK to 'fish in a global pool of talent'. Equally, not everyone who wants to maintain favourable access for EU nationals to the UK wants also to maintain current levels of immigration: they may prefer EU over non-EU immigration for economic or cultural reasons.
It is worth noting that we presented more options at this stage of the Assembly's proceedings than we had originally envisaged. We added option B after the Assembly's first weekend to reflect feedback from Members, who had been interested to learn from the expert speakers that Single As Figure 7 shows, an absolute majority (but a bare absolute majority) of Assembly Members preferred option B over all alternatives. This was despite the fact that we presented evidence indicating that the impact of exercising the available controls on total immigrant numbers would be small: likely in the low thousands. Strikingly, only seven Members chose option E as their first preference, which we clearly presented as the option that would reduce total immigration most. Retrospective analysis of the responses to the survey through which Assembly Members were recruited in summer 2017 indicates that there was a slight skew in the Assembly membership compared to the wider population towards people with more permissive attitudes towards immigration. 5 The evidence we have suggests, however, that, even without this skew, no more than twelve of the fifty Assembly Members would have selected option E. 6 It appears, at least once people are better informed and have had the opportunity to deliberate on the subject, that substantially reducing immigration levels is not the majority preference it is often assumed to be.
Figure 7. Migration between the UK and the EU: first preferences
This outcome reflected a desire to maintain the benefits of immigration while also minimising the costs. That was already apparent from the policy guidelines reported above. Beyond measures to remove migrants who cannot support themselves financially and prevent benefit fraud, the vote on policy guidelines and feedback from the tables suggested that Members also wanted better training for UK citizens to reduce the need for immigration. They wanted more effort to relieve pressure on public services in places with high immigration. And some at least were open to delaying recent immigrants' access to benefits, even if that might exclude some UK nationals too.
Thus, the Members' support for option B does not mean that most opposed a reduction in overall immigration numbers: most did want total immigration to fall. But they wanted this to be done in a targeted and fair way that would minimise harm to the UK economy. The results just outlined are striking. Members ideally wanted the government to succeed in its efforts to secure a comprehensive bespoke trade deal. But they clearly rejected the idea that a 'no deal' Brexit should be seriously countenanced, seeing ongoing close alignment with the EU as the better fall-back. On migration, they advocated a notably nuanced position.
But how much attention do these findings deserve? To what extent do they genuinely give insights into informed public opinion on the Brexit options? Three questions might in particular be asked. First, did the Members of the Citizens' Assembly reflect the broader UK electorate? Second, is a group of fifty people really large enough to provide valuable insights, when we are used to opinion surveys with samples of at least a thousand? Third, were the Assembly's proceedings of sufficient quality to lend the conclusions credence?
Public consultation exercises are often criticised for attracting only 'the usual suspects'. But the Citizens' Assembly on Brexit was different: Members were not self-selected, but carefully chosen through stratified random sampling to ensure they reflected the wider population in terms of key socio-demographic factors and how they voted in the 2016 referendum. We noted above a slight skew towards participants with relatively liberal views on immigration, but this does not appear large enough to explain the Assembly's conclusions.
Moving to the second question, even if the Assembly resembled the wider electorate, is a group of fifty people large enough for its results to be meaningful? Certainly, there is no guarantee that a separate exercise with a different group of fifty people would generate exactly the same conclusions. The evidence that exists on this point suggests, however, that the broad thrust of the results would likely be similar.
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There could, of course, be a danger of 'groupthink', with Members developing over time a groupspecific conception of the issues. But the Assembly, like other deliberative bodies, was designed to avoid this: 8 Members were rotated around different subgroups every day; the total duration of the Assembly was relatively short; Members had three weeks between the two weekends when they lived their usual lives and interacted with non-Members.
Finally, were the Assembly discussions inclusive, informed, balanced, and deliberative, such that we can be confident they reflected the informed and considered views of the Members on the issues in hand? We set out in the first section some of the steps that we took to promote these objectives, including careful weekend design, professional facilitation, and the development of a detailed learning programme overseen by a diverse Advisory Board. Our evidence suggests that these were successful:
 In terms of inclusion, only one Assembly Member disagreed in a survey conducted at the end of the second weekend with the statement 'I have had ample opportunity in the small group discussions to express my views'. There was naturally variation in how long Members spoke for: some people like to talk more than others. But there were no statistically significant differences in speaking time based on Members' ages, genders, ethnicities, social classes, places of residence, or referendum vote choices. We will examine the quality of the Assembly's deliberations in further detail in future research. It is already clear, however, that the Members had a rich experience and engaged effectively with a range of perspectives before drawing their conclusions. They could not, of course, examine all the complexities and technicalities of post-Brexit trade and migration policy. But all the evidence we have presented indicates that they heard broad and balanced evidence, and that their conclusions do provide important insights into the kind of Brexit that people want when they have had an opportunity to learn, think, and deliberate about the issues in depth.
The Citizens' Assembly and UK democracy
The Citizens' Assembly on Brexit was, on all of the criteria just discussed, a considerable success. It brought together a group of people who reflected the diverse make-up of the UK electorate. These Members engaged deeply with the issues in hand. Even on this highly contentious topic, Members from across the Brexit spectrum engaged constructively and respectfully with each other in open and meaningful dialogue. And it proved possible to develop a balanced learning programme that was well regarded on all sides of the Brexit debate. The Citizens' Assembly generated clear and meaningful recommendations that deserve to be taken seriously.
This success raises the question of whether citizens' assemblies and other similar deliberative engagement methods could play a wider positive role in democracy in the UK and elsewhere. Many people -ordinary voters and policy-makers alike -are dissatisfied with the current state of democracy. They worry that the quality of debate about crucial political decisions is often too low and that influential information can be inaccurate. Scope is limited for free and open-mined public discussion in which alternative viewpoints are given considered attention and difficult trade-offs are acknowledged. Social media often appear to cheapen debate further. Many voters feel disillusioned, while policy-makers feel hampered in making decisions that will serve the public interest.
Citizens' assemblies -or smaller deliberative exercises such as citizens' juries -could contribute valuably to a wide array of policy processes. The information that they provide on informed and considered public views is unique, and ought to be valued highly in any democratic decision-making.
They might be particularly useful in one specific category of decisions: those where politicians want to act, but know that, whichever course they adopt, they will be heavily criticised. These are decisions in what Charles Clarke has called the 'too difficult box'. 10 Prominent examples are the debates over assisted dying and the future of social care. There is general agreement that greater spending on social care is needed. But there is considerable disagreement over how best to pay for it, rendering successive governments reluctant to act. A well designed citizens' assembly that allowed a representative cross-section of the population to consider the options, deliberate on their priorities and come up with proposals could help deliver a solution that commanded broad public legitimacy. It is therefore very welcome that two House of Commons committees held a Citizens' Assembly on Social Care in April and May. The results of this exercise were not yet available at the time of writing, but they will merit careful attention.
Conclusion
The evidence from the Citizens' Assembly on Brexit is that most voters want a pragmatic Brexit: if the UK is leaving the EU, they want it to strike the best deal possible. They want politicians to be concerned, above all, with protecting the economy, public services, and living standards across all parts of the UK. Their optimal outcome is a bespoke deal between the UK and the EU, such as the UK government is currently pursuing. But if that proves unattainable, they would prefer the UK to stay in the Single Market and the Customs Union than to leave the EU with no deal. They want to contain immigration while maintaining a substantial level of free movement. These are the conclusions of a diverse sample of the UK electorate who engaged intensively and deeply with the issues over two weekends. They deserve to be taken seriously by policy-makers.
The Assembly suggests also that deliberative bodies such as this could have a valuable place in future UK governance. Even on a highly polarised issue such as Brexit, they can foster informed, considered, open-minded discussion. Injecting such exercises into other processes of decisionmaking could be valuable for the health of democracy.
